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NEGLIGENCE-DuTms OF RAn.RoAD-LANDoWNER TowARD FRE-
QUENT TRESPASSER-LIMITATIONS ON Rrmrrs OF TRESPASSER-The 
duties of a landowner toward one who enters the land without con-
sent may no longer be determined, in many cases, by merely stating 
the fact that the intruder is a trespasser whose presence is unknown 
to the landowner. This comment will discuss an area in which the 
relationship of landowner and trespasser inter se has been greatly 
altered, and will deal in particular with a class of cases which serve 
to limit the expanded rights of the trespasser. 
I. The Traditional View: Conservatism 
The occupier of land has traditionally held a favored position in 
the law of negligence. The rights protected through the development 
of actions on the case were early subjected to special limitations im~ 
posed for the benefit of landowners. Thus, in the ordinary negli-
gence case, the first question has been generally the degree of risk 
to the plaintiff involved in the actions of the defendant; if the law 
considered this risk unreasonable it would impose upon the defendant 
the duty of reasonable care. If, however, the injury happened to 
occur upon land owned by the defendant, then the primary consider-
ation ceased to be the amount of risk to the plaintiff, and became the 
relation of the parties to each other with respect to the status of the 
plaintiff upon the land. The policy of the law was to give to the 
landowner the freest possible use of his land, and he was to be limited 
in this freedom only to the extent to which he voluntarily assumed 
limitations: by consenting to another's use of his land, or by actually 
inviting another onto his land.1 In this manner was developed an 
almost purely conceptual or definitional approach toward considera-
tion of the duties owed by an occupier of land to a person upon the 
land. The plaintiff was placed in a certain category-trespasser, li-
censee, or invitee-in strict accordance with the degree to which the 
defendant-landowner consented to his presence on the land. Once 
his status on the land was determined, the duties owed him by the 
landowner were well settled.2 
1 PROSSER, Toll.TS, §77, p. 611 (1941): " ••• in a civilization based on private 
<>wnership, it is considered a socially desirable policy to allow a man to use his own land 
in his own way, without the burden of watching for and protecting those who come there 
without permission or right." 
2 Concerning the duty of a landowner to keep a lookout for a licensee on the land, 
however, there has been considerable disagreement. For a statement of the empirical solu-
tion to this problem, see 50 M:rcH. L. REv. 617 (1952). 
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IL The Modern View: Humanitarianism 
The early cases in this area, basing themselves expressly or im-
plicitly on the policy that the landowner is to have the freest possible 
use of his land, were largely unembarrassed by serious judicial con-
sideration of another often-asserted policy argument: that society has 
an interest in the lives of its members. The rights of an isolated 
plaintiff, who had admittedly committed a legal wrong in entering 
the land of the defendant, were thought to be outweighed by the 
rights of the defendant qua landowner. With the increasing indus-
trialization and mechanization of the uses to which land was put, the 
risk borne by an intruder upon land was vastly increased; and when 
this increased risk was coupled with a large increase in the numbers 
of persons intruding upon a given piece of land, many courts felt 
that the interests of society demanded that additional protection be 
given these intruders, even at the price of enlarging the duties of the 
landowner. Thus were born the frequent trespass cases, the typical 
case being the use of a railroad's right of way as a short cut by large 
numbers of trespassers. In such a situation various new duties were 
imposed upon the railroad-landowner: the duty to keep a lookout for 
persons upon the tracks, the duty to warn of approaching trains, the 
duty to use reasonable care with respect to the operation of trains3-
all of these duties being imposed in light of the increased hazard to 
persons who may be using the tracks, without permission, for their 
own purposes. 4 
What is the legal status of such a person upon the tracks? If 
this question can be answered without prior consideration of the duties 
which should, from the standpoint of socially desirable policy, be 
imposed upon the railroad, it seems quite clear that this person is 
a trespasser. To hold otherwise is to say that the railroad consented, 
in some degree, to the use of its tracks by the public generally, and 
in all but the rarest case this position is completely untenable.5 The 
s 2 TORTS RESTATEMENT §334 (1934): "A possessor of land who knows, or from 
facts within his knowledge should know, that trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited 
area thereof, is subject to liability for bodily harm there caused to them by his failure to 
carry on an activity involving a risk of death or serious bodily harm with reasonable care 
for their safety." 
4 The extended annotation in 167 A.L.R. 1253 (1947) is titled "Duty of railroad 
toward persons using private crossing or commonly used footpath over or along railroad 
tracks.'' 
5 See Eldredge, "Tort Liability to Trespassers," 12 TEMPLE L.Q. 32 at 34 et seq. 
(1937), for a complete and colorful destruction of the notion that the frequent trespasser 
has permision to enter railroad property. To the same effect see 2 TORTS RESTATEMENT 
§330, comment b (1934), which discusses the distinction between permission and 
toleration. 
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courts, however, in their struggle to find some historically sound footing 
on which to base liability, have commonly resorted to the fiction of 
classifying these intruders as licensees, finding consent where clearly 
none exists. Entirely new categories have sometimes been created, 
the most common being the "implied" license. And if a court feels 
that on the particular facts the trespasser should not be clothed in 
the various new rights, he will then be a naked, or bare, or mere 
licensee, if not a naked trespasser. This process of judicial invention 
has on occasion resulted in what may be regarded only as definitional 
nonsense.6 
It is of course recognized that the importance of these cases lies 
not in what the intruder is called, but in the reasons for the constant 
struggle on the part of the courts to call him something other than 
what he actually is-a trespasser. These reasons are threefold: 
1. As a joint result of the dangerous activity conducted by the 
defendant on his land and the large numbers of trespassers thereon, 
ordinary principles of humanity dictate a restatement of the rights of 
these trespassers. 
2. When the trespasses are confined to a limited area of the 
defendant's land,7 the burden of watching for, warning, and using 
reasonable care with respect to these trespassers is lessened. Thus 
the courts feel that the imposition of these duties works an insignifi-
cant retreat from the policy that the landowner is to have the freest 
possible use of his land. 8 
6 "Under Iowa law there are three classes of licensees: (1) A licensee by express 
invitation is one who is directly invited by the owner of land to enter upon it. (2) A 
licensee by implied invitation is one who has been invited to enter upon land by the 
owner or occupier by some affirmative act done by the owner or occupant, or by appearances 
which justify persons generally in believing that such owner or occupant had given his 
consent to the public generally to enter upon or to cross over his premises .••• (3) A 
'hare licensee' is one who enters upon the land of another without objection, or by mere 
permission, sufferance, or acquiescence of the owner." Chicago, G.W. Ry. Co. v. Beecher, 
(8th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 394 at 401. Plaintiff, who was less than three years old, had 
followed a frequently used path onto the railroad tracks, and was struck by a train. Held, 
plaintiff was a licensee by implied invitation, and was owed the duties of lookout and due 
care, which would not have been true had plaintiff been classified a ''hare" licensee. 
7 In Pennsylvania, for instance, a person walking longitudinally on the tracks will not 
he owed the duties of lookout, warning, and due care, no matter how many persons 
customarily use such path. Miller v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 350 Pa. 424, 39 A. (2d) 576 
(1944). Contra: Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 311 Ky. 725, 225 S.W. (2d) 299 
(1949). 
s A few states regard the landowner's freedom of use in this respect as sacred, and 
have refused to go along with the great majority of courts in the frequent trespass cases. 
As examples of cases which are undoubtedly logically sound, hut which seem harsh in light 
of the general liberality in this area, consider Jackson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 176 Md. 1, 
3 A. (2d) 719 (1938), and Willey v. Maine Central R. Co., 137 Me. 223, 18 A. (2d) 
316 (1941). 
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3. It will not be denied that courts of law are not wholly un-
concerned with the "equities" of parties to a lawsuit. The moral 
reprehensibility of the frequent trespass (ignoring, for the moment, 
its illegality) is ·certainly not great. The court is asked to place the 
plaintiff in a category which labels him a wrongdoer, and this in the 
face of evidence showing that he, and perhaps hundreds of others, 
had daily crossed the tracks at a certain point with the knowledge 
of the railroad's employees and without objection, or at least without 
effective interference, by the railroad. This the courts are generally 
unwilling to do.9 It is at least doubtful whether the person who 
habitually crosses a railroad track is conscious of committing a wrong, 
moral or legal. In this respect his mental state is similar to that of 
a child who enters railroad property with the purpose of playing on 
a turntable.10 At any rate, most courts have tended to treat the fre-
quent trespasser as an innocent plaintiff who has been injured through 
the careless conduct of another, rather than as a wrongdoer who has 
been injured through a landowner's attempts to use his land in a 
profitable rnanner.11 
III. Limitations on the Modern View: the "Different Purpose" Cases 
In Shaw -v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,12 plaintiff, a twelve-
year-old boy, was attempting to climb over one of defendant's freight 
trains, two of which were blocking a well-defined and commonly used 
footpath over the tracks, and was injured when the train started with-
out warning. The train had stopped only momentarily in order for 
a switch to be thrown. Both children and adults had on prior occa-
sions climbed over cars which blocked this path, and plaintiff testi-
fied that employees of the defendant were aware of this practice. The 
lower court rendered judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto. 
9 The Wisconsin court in an early case has even gone so far as to hold the railroad 
estopped to deny the ''license": Brinilson v. Chicago & N. Ry. Co., 144 Wis. 614, 129 
N.W. 664 (1911). This case is also notable in that the negligence complained of was the 
failure of the railroad to repair a dangerous artificial condition on the right of way. 
10 See Green, "Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsi-
bility in Tort," 21 MrcH. L. REv. 495 (1923). This article analyzes the attractive nuisance 
cases and justifies them on the basis that the trespassing child is unable to appreciate the 
moral blameworthiness of his actions, and thus should not be dealt with as a wrongdoer. 
And the American· Law Institute does not require, as a prerequisite to moral blamelessness, 
that the child be ''lured" onto the land. He need not know of the existence of the 
dangerous condition at the time of entry. 2 ToRTS REsTATEMENT §339, comment a (1934). 
11 For a recent article thoroughly documenting the modern trend away from pure 
delinitionalism, and toward the ordinary "risk" tests for the presence of a duty, see James, 
"Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers," 63 YALE L.J. 144 
(1953). To the same effect see 22 So. CAL. L. REv. 318 (1949). 
12 374 Pa. 8, 96 A. (2d) 923 (1953). 
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, the evidence of the ex-
istence of a license to cross railroad cars being considered insufficient 
to raise a jury question. 
This recent case is an example of a class of cases in which all 
the elements of a typical frequent trespass case are present, but as 
a result of some conduct or purpose on the part of the plaintiff, re-
covery is denied. The following are further examples of such cases, 
in which the railroad is held to owe no duties to the plaintiff: the 
child sitting on the tracks,1 8 the drunk lying unconscious upon the 
ties,14 the man picking up coal from the tracks,15 the man sweeping 
up spilled wheat under and around the cars.16 Perhaps the most 
striking example of this type of case is one which occurred in Penn-
sylvania, a state which liberally protects the frequent trespasser who 
crosses over the tracks at a given point,17 but which refuses to im-
pose the same duties as to a frequent trespasser traveling longitudi-
nally on the tracks.18 In that case the plaintiff was walking longi-
tudinally on the tracks and was struck by a train, evidently at the 
exact moment that he reached a "permissive crossing"19 over the tracks. 
The court said: " ... the mere fact that a person is at a place where 
the railway company would owe him a duty of care if he were engaged 
upon a certain errand, does not establish such a duty if his presence 
is for a different purpose." The court added: "Certainly the interest 
of a longitudinal wayfarer does not change when he reaches a cross 
path. The railroad was indeed charged with a duty of observing 
care at such spots, but not care with respect to him. He can no more 
18 Lee's Achnr. v. Hines, 202 Ky. 240, 259 S.W. 338 (1924). Syllabus: "Persons 
sitting or lying on railroad track, even where its use by the public as a walkway is expected 
and licensed by the railroad company, are trespassers .••. " Accord, Louisville & N.R. Co. 
v. Byrge's Admx., 273 Ky. 570, 117 S.W. (2d) 585 (1938). 
14 "Applying the general rule to the facts of this case, we find that when Ashlock 
ceased to use the right of way of the railroad company for the purpose of travel, and lay 
down motionless upon its ties or became unconscious and fell down, he became a tres-
passer. The railroad company was under no obligation to anticipate his presence in that 
condition." Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Gates, 186 Va. 195 at 202, 42 S.E. (2d) 283 
(1947). Accord, Connelly, Admx. v. The Virginian Ry. Co., 124 W.Va. 254, 20 S.E. 
(2d) 885 (1942). Contra, Carlson v. The Connecticut Co., 95 Conn. 724, 112 A. 646 
(1921). 
15 Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Philpot's Administrator, 215 Ky. 682, 286 S.W. 1078 
(1926). Syllabus: "Trainmen owed licensee no duty if he was picking up coal on tracks 
instead of using them as a walkway, though place was habitually used as a walkway." 
16 Ducoulombier v. Baldwin, (Mo. App. 1937) 101 S.W. (2d) 96. 
17 Pennsylvania cases showing this liberality are discussed in Eldredge, "Tort Liability 
to Trespassers," 12 TEMPLE L.Q. 32 (1937). 
18 Miller v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 350 Pa. 424, 39 A. (2d) 576 (1944). 
19 This is the term used by the Pennsylvania court to·signify the point on the tracks 
at which the railroad owes to the frequent trespasser the duties of lookout, warning, and 
due care. 
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stand on its duty to others than can one who is not within the class 
which a statute is designed to protect."20 
The courts have generally held, in the "different purpose" cases, 
that the duties of lookout, warning, and due care are not owed by 
the railroad to the plaintiff,21 usually basing this decision on the 
ground that the status of the plaintiff on the land has changed from 
licensee to trespasser. Here too it is obvious that the importance of 
these cases lies not in what the plaintiff is called, but in the reasons 
for this judicially-decreed change of status. Justification must be 
found, if at all, in the light of particular fact situations. . 
As was noted above, an important reason for the imposition on 
the railroad-landowner of the duties of lookout, warning, and due 
care, is the increased hazard to trespassers caused by the landowner's 
more mechanized use of his land, coupled with a large increase in 
the numbers of trespassers on the land, i.e., a greater danger to a 
larger segment of society. The facts of a particular case may indi-
cate to the court that the likelihood of a trespasser being within the 
scope of the risk created by the landowner's activity is relatively slight, 
either because of the hour of the day,22 or because of the extraordinary 
character of the trespass which would be necessary to place the tres-
passer within the scope of that risk.23 To that extent one of the 
policy considerations-the interest of society in the lives and limbs 
.of its members-which led to the imposition of the various duties in 
the ordinary frequent trespass case, is present, if at all, in a much 
lesser degree; and consequently a court may refuse to impose these 
duties. Few, however, of the "different purpose" cases may be ex-
plained on this ground. 
20 Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., (2d Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 49 at 51, 52. Is it remarkable 
that this famous case should be cited for so substantive a proposition? 
21 Contra: Burnam v. Chicago, G.W. R. Co., 340 Mo. 25, 100 S.W. (2d) 858 (1936); 
Figard v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 361 Pa. 380, 65 A. (2d) 411 (1949). 
22 In Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Butcher's Admr., 263 Ky. 45, 91 S.W. (2d) 551 
(1936), it was held that the railway company owed to the decedent no duty to maintain 
a lookout at three o'clock in the morning. Cf. the better reasoning in Barron v. Baltimore 
& O.R. Co., 116 W.Va. 21 at 23, 178 S.E. 277 (1935): " ••. general rule that trainmen 
must exercise ordinary care, commensurate with the risk of injuring someone on the track. 
But as we have said so frequently, care is a relative term •••. The requisite care would 
be greater during some hours (of the twenty-four) than during others. So the care exacted 
in a given case would depend entirely on the facts of that case." 
23 So, for instance, in Shaw v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 374 Pa. 8, 96 A. (2d) 923 
(1953), the court may have felt that climbing on railroad cars is such an unusual type of 
trespass that the railroad may reasonably operate under the assumption that no one will 
trespass in that manner. In view of plaintiff's apparently uncontradicted testimony that 
such trespasses had frequently occurred, to the knowledge of defendant's employees, such 
an assumption does not seem reasonable. 
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The most commonly stated justification for the result in the or-
dinary frequent trespass case is that the railroad will not be exces-
sively burdened through the judicial requirement that its engineers 
look down the tracks, sound their whistles, and run more slowly at 
certain points on the tracks; and thus the imposition of these duties 
is thought not to work a significant departure from the policy that 
the landowner is to have the freest possible use of his land. If the 
due care that a plaintiff demands in a particular "different purpose" 
case would seriously hamper the railroad in its normal operations, 
constituting a very real inroad on its freedom of use, there is no 
doubt that one of the strongest reasons for protecting the frequent 
trespasser is no longer present. So, for instance, in the Shaw case,24 
the plaintiff contended that the railroad should have four men sta-
tioned to warn trespassers that they could not climb over the cars. In 
refusing to find that the plaintiff was a licensee, the court said: "That 
would be stretching the legal fiction of a permissive way or crossing 
to an unreasonable and unjustifiable extreme."25 
Granting that the above policy considerations are at times helpful 
in explaining the reasons for the refusal of the courts to impose upon 
the railroad the duties of lookout and due care, certainly not all of 
the "different purpose" cases are amenable to this explanation. The 
man picking up coal on the tracks, for example, asks merely that the 
same duties owing to other trespassers on the tracks at that point be 
owed to him. Testimony for the plaintiff in the Shaw case indicated 
that for a long time inhabitants of the area had been accustomed to 
climb over cars blocking the path over the tracks, and that the em-
ployees of the railroad were aware of this practice. Why was the 
court in that case unwilling to impose on the railroad a more limited 
duty than the duty of maintaining an effective lookout, such as the 
duty to sound a warning before moving the train? Quite evidently 
the courts are influenced by considerations other than the infrequency 
of the trespass and the added burden on the railroad. 
A common type of tort situation is that in which a person enters 
business premises and is injured, and is later held by the courts to be 
a trespasser or licensee, rather than an invitee. The landowner who 
invites the public to enter his premises to transact business takes upon 
24Ibid. 
25 Id. at 12. And in Groves v. Southern Ry. Co., 61 Ga. App. 651, 7 S.E. (2d) 208 
(1940), the court felt that the joint use by the public and the railroad of the railroad 
switchyards would be so inconsistent and dangerous, and so burdensome to the railroad, 
that it would not infer that plaintiff had been licensed to walk there. 
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himself extensive duties, and it seems entirely proper that these duties 
should not be enforced in favor of one who enters the land for a pur-
pose inconsistent with the scope of the invitation, or who enters a 
portion of the land to which the invitation does not extend. In such 
cases it may be said generally that the extent of the duty owed is 
measured by the degree of consent. Without subscribing to the fiction 
that the railroad consents to the presence of the frequent trespasser 
upon its tracks, and that conversely it does not so consent to the pres-
ence of the "different purpose" trespasser, it seems that to some extent 
an analogy between the invitee cases and the "different purpose" cases 
is helpful. It is true that the railroad has not consented to the frequent 
trespass, but the important fact is that the law has consented for it. In 
the case of the invitee the question is whether the person on the land 
has deviated substantially from the scope of a very real consent granted 
by the landowner. In the "different purpose" cases the question seems 
to be whether the person on the land has deviated substantially from 
the scope of a fictional consent implied by law. In both cases the result 
is the same-the person on the land is no longer protected by the duties 
attendant upon the consent. 
What is the reason for the refusal of the courts to consent, for the 
railroad, to the presence of the "different purpose" trespasser upon the 
tracks? An explanation based on the infrequency of the trespass and 
the added burden on the railroad is, as has been seen, incomplete. It 
will be remembered that one of the reasons for implying this consent 
in the case of the ordinary frequent trespass~r is that the courts are 
simply unwilling to deal with him as a wrongdoer. He, in company 
with many others, has long been accustomed to cross the tracks at a 
certain point, to the knowledge of employees of the railroad; there is 
no doubt that it is difficult to consider his actions morally reprehensible. 
Consequently the courts hold that the railroad has consented to these 
actions. When this result is viewed in the light of the refusal of the 
courts to imply this consent in the case of the "different purpose" 
trespasser, the conclusion is inevitable that the courts are applying a 
sort of legal "clean hands" test to the plaintiff's actions. With much 
reluctance, and through the use of a completely transparent fiction, the 
courts have been willing to say that in certain cases a person may 
voluntarily enter land without the consent of the landowner and yet 
he will not be considered a wrongdoer. But this person is told, in effect, 
that he is not to assume that the courts are no longer concerned with 
the rights of the landowner as against frequent trespassers. The culpa-
bility of the trespass will be carefully scrutinized in each case. The 
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deserving trespasser has been given what amounts very nearly to a 
legal privilege to use another's land. He must not abuse this privilege. 
IV. Conclusions 
That a present-day court, co:p.fronted by a plaintiff who has been 
injured while on the land of another, is not ready to abandon all his-
toric precedent in favor of purely equitable considerations is perhaps 
too obvious for comment. The first question, today as a hundred years 
ago, is the status of the plaintiff on the land. It is clear, however, that 
modem cases indicate a decrease in reliance upon "reasoning by defini-
tion," although this is apparent only from the results of the cases, cer-
tainly not from the language of the courts.26 This indication appears 
most clearly in the frequent trespass cases, which virtually eliminate 
from consideration the fact that the plaintiff is a legal wrongdoer. 
The right of the landowner to the use and enjoyment of his land 
is not, however, held subject to the caprice of the frequent trespasser. 
In part through his ability to show himself equitably entitled to protec-
tion, a very special type of trespasser has persuaded the courts to depart 
from the definitional approach to duty. But this departure has been 
in spirit only; the definitions themselves and their correlative duties 
stand affirmed in countless weighty precedents. Through the "different 
purpose" cases the courts have generally made it clear that any sub-
stantial deviation from this limited type of trespass will cause the form 
of the definition to be reunited with its original substance. 
William D. Keeler, S.Ed. 
26 Occasionally, however, a frankly empirical approach will be employed, the fact that 
the plaintiff is a trespasser being completely disregarded. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Jones, 
78 Okla. 204 at 206, 190 P. 385 (1920): "It is a sound and wholesome rule of law, 
humane and conservative of human life, that, without regard to the question whether 
the person killed or injured in the particular case was or was not a trespasser or a bare 
licensee upon the track of the railway company, the company is bound to exercise special 
care and watchfulness at any point upon its tracks, where people may be expected upon 
the track in considerable numbers, as, where the roadbed is constantly used by pedestrians. 
At such places the railway company is bound to anticipate the presence of persons on the 
track, to keep a reasonable lookout for them, to give warning signals, such as will apprise 
them of the danger of an approaching train, to moderate the speed of its train so as to 
enable them to escape injury •.•• " St. Louis & S.F. R. Co. v. Jones, 78 Okla. 204 at 206, 
190 P. 385 (1920), quoting with approval '113 of the syllabus of the court in Missouri K. 
& T. R. Co. v. Wolf, 76 Okla. 195, 184 P. 765 (1919). 
